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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to undertake a comprehensive study of LCC market entry 
and exit in Europe between 1992 and 2012. In the 20 year period between 1992 and 
2012, 43 low cost carriers (LCCs) have taken advantage of the progressive 
liberalisation of the European aviation market and commenced scheduled flight 
operations within the continent. Of these 43, only 10 remain operational, a failure 
rate of 77%. This paper contributes to extant literature on LCCs by examining the 
market entry, business practices, operating longevity and fate of failed operators to 
characterise European LCC market exit. Drawing on the findings of a detailed 
continental-wide study, the paper identifies that an airline’s start-up date, the nature 
and size of its operation and the size and composition of its aircraft fleet are key 
factors which influence LCC success and failure. The implications for both European 
and emerging LCC markets are discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
The reasons for, characteristics of and the myriad socio-economic and cultural 
implications resulting from policies of global airline deregulation, air transport 
liberalisation and the dramatic growth of low cost carriers (LCCs) worldwide have 
attracted considerable political, academic, and public attention. Worldwide, 
numerous articles, reports, and empirical analyses have been conducted into 
virtually every facet of LCC operation, from the corporate business philosophies, 
marketing, and revenue management strategies adopted by the principal 
protagonists, to the development of their route networks, their relationships with 
airports, and customer experiences of low cost flying (see Section 2). The majority of 
research has focused on the socio-economic benefits and ‘success stories’ 
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associated with the emergence of a new type of airline that took advantage of the 
more liberalised operating environment to develop new business models and 
operating practices that avoided the expense associated with traditional full-service 
airline offerings, lowered their cost base and allowed them to pass the savings on to 
consumers in the form of lower fares.  
Scholars from a variety of academic disciplines have examined the regional 
economic benefits that may result from the formation of new LCCs, the impact of 
new routes and destinations on competition and/or the effect of LCC product and 
service innovations on employees, subcontractors, consumers and competitors (see 
section 2). In contrast, little research has explored the characteristics of LCC failure 
and market exit. Considering the volatility of airlines and air traffic, particularly during 
periods of economic recession, this is a significant omission. It thus represents a 
highly topical and critical issue for policy makers, regions, airports and consumers. 
Certainly, the implications of routes being withdrawn, links being severed at short 
notice and airlines ceasing operations are potentially far reaching, especially for 
regions with limited alternative air service provision or sources of employment.  
 
In response to the paucity of empirical research into LCC failure and the need to 
identify factors which may contribute to LCC market exit, the aim of this paper is to 
undertake a comprehensive study of LCC market entry and exit in Europe between 
1992 and 2012. The paper begins by reviewing the salient literatures on low cost 
carriers before the method is described and the temporal, operational and spatial 
characteristics of European LCC market entry and exit are described. The paper 
discusses the characteristics of LCC market exit that have been identified and 
concludes by examining the implications of LCC market failure for airline and airport 
operators, competition, and consumers both within Europe and in emerging LCC 
markets in other world regions. 
 
2. The LCC phenomenon 
The emergence, expansion and evolution of low cost carriers over the last 35 years 
has been well documented and arguably represents one of the most significant 
developments in recent commercial aviation history (Calder 2002; Lawton 2002; 
Gross and Lück 2013). Pioneered by Texas-based Southwest Airlines and widely 
adopted in the immediate aftermath of the 1978 US Airline Deregulation Act, 
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subsequent policies of air transport liberalisation in Europe and parts of Latin 
America, Africa, the Middle and Far East, Indian subcontinent and Australasia from 
the mid-1990s onwards (see Doganis 1994, Williams 1994, Caves 1997 and Goetz 
and Sutton 1997 for an overview) has meant that low cost carriers have become an 
increasingly global phenomenon that have dramatically reconfigured the patterns, 
processes, customer expectations and experiences of flight. Globally, the LCC 
sector has expanded rapidly to the point where LCCs now account for 22% of all 
passenger flights and 26% of all airline seats worldwide (OAG, 2012). Despite 
significant regional variation both between and within different LCC markets, some of 
the most dramatic growth is currently occurring in the rapidly expanding economies 
and recently liberalised air transport markets in Asia and the Middle East. However, 
in terms of regional market penetration, LCCs have arguably had the biggest impact 
in Europe where they currently account for over 28% of all passenger flights (OAG, 
2011).  
 
Although there is no universally accepted definition of what constitutes a low cost 
carrier, Button and Ison (2008) suggest that LCCs can be distinguished from other 
airlines on account of the former’s close adherence to many (if not all) of the 
following cost-minimisation strategies: To reduce maintenance and training costs, 
ease scheduling, and take advantage of bulk purchase discounts from 
manufacturers, most LCCs operate a single aircraft type (usually Boeing 737 or 
Airbus A320 family airframes) and a single airframe-engine combination. These 
aircraft are configured with an all-economy class cabin to maximise the numbers of 
revenue-earning seats that are available and they are flown on frequent short-haul 
point-to-point services, often between cheaper and less congested secondary 
regional airports. In order to maximise aircraft utilisation, each aircraft performs 
multiple services in a day and are turned around between flights in as little as 30 
minutes. LCC operations are further characterised by their ‘no frills’ cabin service 
policy and limited customer service. Typically, LCCs also make extensive use of 
ancillary revenue generation and have transformed conventional cost items including 
hold baggage and in-flight catering into revenue streams. To further minimise costs, 
they often enter into commercial partnerships with third-party companies (such as 
accommodation providers and car-hire firms), subcontract aspects of their operation, 
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engage in bold and often controversial marketing and use the internet for the 
majority of their distribution.   
 
Much of the early literature on the emergence and growth of European low cost 
aviation examined the nature of the low cost model and the operating practices of its 
principal protagonists (see Lawton 2002; Calder 2002; Alamdari and Fagan 2005). 
This body of work quickly expanded to include the impact of LCCs on legacy 
operators and on competition (Francis et al 2007; Doganis 2010; Fageda et al 2011), 
examine how LCCs have changed the nature of the airline-airport relationship 
(Francis et al 2003, 2004; Starkie 2012; Graham, 2013) as well as the economic 
impact of new LCC services on patterns of business, tourism, and migration 
(Graham and Dennis 2010, Castillo-Manzano et al 2011). Other studies have 
focused on LCCs’ revenue management and pricing strategies (Gillen and Morrison 
2003, Alves et al 2009), their use of ICT and the internet (Hanlon 2007; Calder 2002), 
the spatial distribution and evolution of their route networks (Dobruszkes 2013), the 
charismatic management styles of LCC leadership (Calder 2002) and customer 
experiences of low cost flying (Mason 2000). 
 
Crucially, and with the notable exception of Button (2012), very little has been written 
about LCC failure or market exit despite the volatile and highly competitive nature of 
the European airline sector. In order to identify the characteristics of market failure 
and LCC market exit in Europe, a comprehensive continent-wide study of LCC 
market entry and exit in Europe between 1992 and 2012 was conducted.  
 
3. Method  
Every low cost carrier that was registered and actively operating revenue-generating 
flights in Europe - defined here as members of the European Economic Area (i.e. 
European Union members plus Norway, Switzerland and Iceland) - between 1992 
and 2012 was identified from an exhaustive online interrogation of aviation 
databases, airline resource sites, and academic publications. Only European airlines 
that flew under their own air operator’s certificate and/or functioned as a distinct low 
cost operation were included in the study. Non-European based LCCs that serve 
European destinations, ‘virtual’ LCCs that sold tickets on behalf of other operators 
but who did not operate their own aircraft and ‘paper’ LCCs which were proposed but 
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which never operated a revenue service (such as UK-based low cost operator ‘Now’) 
were not considered. Similarly airlines including Monarch (UK) and Aer Lingus 
(Ireland) who experimented with cost cutting in the mid-2000s but who didn’t create a 
separate low cost subsidiary were excluded as were ad-hoc charter operators who 
supplied aircraft and/or crew under contract to LCCs. 
 
One of the principal challenges inherent in this approach was the lack of a definitive 
and universally-accepted list of which airlines could be rightly classified as being ‘low 
cost’. In order to resolve this issue, the extent to which each airline’s business model 
aligned with the principal LCC operating characteristics identified by Button and Ison 
(2008) was used as the framework. Any carrier whose operating practices did not 
conform with at least eight of the defining characteristics was excluded from the 
study. As a result, airlines including Italian regional operator Alpi Eagles, UK regional 
airline FlyBe and Finnish carrier Air Finland, all of which have been identified as 
LCCs in some quarters, were not included (Klophaus et al, JATM 23). 
 
The twenty year period from 1992 to 2012 was chosen as the time period of study for 
two reasons. Firstly, it covers the full period of European liberalisation that followed 
the ratification of the Third Aviation Liberalisation Package in June 1992 which 
facilitated the creation of a single European aviation market and secondly it includes 
two major phases of EU expansion in which new countries, including Poland, 
Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, the Czech Republic, and the Baltic States, joined the 
EU and extended the spatial extent of Europe’s liberalised aviation market.  
 
In all, 43 European LCCs were identified and the principal nature of their operation 
classified according to Francis et al’s (2006) five-point low cost airline typology 
(Table 1). The five categories Francis et al identified are: Southwest copycats 
(airlines which closely adhere to the original Southwest Airlines model); FSC 
subsidiaries (airlines established by incumbent full-service operators to protect or 
capture new market share); diversified charter operators (who established a 
separate brand or carrier to operate low cost scheduled services); cost cutters 
(legacy airlines which have tackled their costs to offer a reduced service); and state 
subsidised carriers who complete on price. Interestingly, 42 of the 43 European 
LCCs identified were Southwest copycats, FSC subsidiaries or diversified charter 
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operators. The only exception was UK-based Debonair which did not fit into any of 
the five categories (see discussion). 
 
For each airline, the Flightglobal and airliners.net databases were interrogated to 
determine the date of market entry and, if applicable, the date of its final flight/market 
exit and fate (e.g. bankruptcy, merger, take-over or subsumed within the parent 
airline’s operations). For the purposes of this paper, an airline was deemed to have 
left the market when it ceased flight operations for the final time. 
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Table 1: The 43 European LCCs operational between 1992 and 2012.  
 
Airline  Country of origin Type of operation 
Air Berlin Germany Diversified charter operator 
Air Polonia Poland Southwest copycat 
Air Scotland UK Diversified charter operator 
Air Turquoise France Southwest copycat 
Basiq Air  Netherlands Diversified charter operator 
Bmibaby  UK FSC subsidiary (bmi) 
Buzz  UK FSC subsidiary (KLM) 
Centralwings Poland Southwest copycat 
Click Air  Spain FSC subsidiary (Iberia) 
Color Air Norway Southwest copycat 
Dba  Germany FSC subsidiary (British Airways) 
Debonair UK No category identified 
easyJet UK Southwest copycat 
EU Jet Ireland Southwest copycat 
FlyGlobespan UK Diversified charter operator 
Flying Finn Finland Southwest copycat 
FlyMe Sweden Southwest copycat 
FlyNordic Sweden Diversified charter operator 
Germania Express (gexx) Germany Diversified charter operator 
Germanwings  Germany FSC subsidiary (Lufthansa) 
Get Jet Poland Southwest copycat 
Go  UK FSC subsidiary (British Airways) 
Goodjet Sweden Southwest copycat 
HLX Germany Diversified charter operator 
Iceland Express/WOW Iceland Southwest copycat 
Jet2 UK Diversified charter operator 
MyAir Italy Southwest copy-cat 
MyTravelLite  UK Diversified charter operator 
Norwegian Norway Southwest copycat 
Ryanair Ireland Southwest copycat 
SkyEurope Slovakia Southwest copycat 
Snowflake  Scandinavia FSC subsidiary (SAS) 
Star1 Lithuania Diversified charter operator 
Sterling Denmark Diversified charter operator 
ThomsonFly.com  UK Diversified charter operator 
Transavia Netherlands Diversified charter operator 
V Bird Netherlands Southwest copycat 
Virgin Express  Belgium FSC subsidiary (Virgin) 
Volare Web  Italy FSC subsidiary (Alitalia) 
Vueling  Spain  FSC subsidiary (Iberia) 
Windjet Italy Diversified charter operator 
Wizz Air Poland Southwest copycat 
Zoom UK UK Diversified charter operator 
Airlines listed in italics were operating in January 2013.  
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4. Findings and discussion 
During the twenty year period under examination, 43 European-registered low cost 
carriers commenced operations in the continent. 17 (40%) were Southwest copy cats, 
15 were diversified charter operators (35%) and 10 were subsidiaries of full-service 
carriers (23%). The only exception was UK-based Debonair which did not fit any of 
the aforementioned categories. Of the 43 airlines identified, 33 have now left the 
market – a failure rate of 77%. While this figure is considerably lower than the 94% 
failure rate among new entrant post-deregulation start-ups that occurred in the 
United States (see Gudmundsson 1998), our figures only relate to LCCs, not all new 
start-ups (indeed, it is appreciated that numerous other airlines, including UK-based 
Duo, also left the market during the period under study).   
 
At the time of writing (July 2013), only ten carriers (Air Berlin, easyJet, Germanwings, 
Jet2, Norwegian, Ryanair, Transavia, Vueling, Wizz Air and WOW) are still operating 
and, of these, only easyJet, Ryanair, Wizz Air and WOW have stuck closely to the 
original Southwest-inspired low cost model. Air Berlin has joined the OneWorld 
airline alliance and is operating long-haul transatlantic services. Transavia of the 
Netherlands and Jet2 of the UK operate charter and IT services as well as low cost 
flights. Aircraft belonging to Spanish operator Vueling and German carrier 
Germanwings are used by full service operators Iberia and Lufthansa respectively 
and can be seen at major airports, including London/Heathrow, and Norwegian has 
announced plans to establish a new low cost long-haul operation using Boeing 787s. 
In the subsections that follow the chronology of European LCC market entry and the 
characteristics of market exit is examined. 
 
4.1 Chronology of European LCC market entry 
A chronology of European LCC market entry is presented in Table 2. From this data, 
it is possible to disaggregate the airlines into groups according to when they 
commenced operations and create a four-phase classification system of European 
LCC market entry. 
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Table 2: Chronology of European LCC market entry. 
 Year Number Airline 
   
   
   
 P
io
ne
er
 
Pre-
1992 
1 Ryanair (founded in 1985 as a regional operator, 
restructured as a LCC in 1990/91*)  
1993 1 Norwegian  
1994 0  
1995 1 easyJet 
1996 2 Debonair, Virgin Express 
1997 0  
1998 3 Air Berlin (founded in 1978, launches Mallorca shuttle and 
seat-only low cost services in 1998**), Color Air, Go Fly 
E
ar
ly
 
A
do
pt
er
 1999 0  
2000 2 Basiq Air, Buzz 
2001 0  
2002 6 Bmibaby, Germanwings, Goodjet, HLX, MyTraveLite, 
SkyEurope 
M
ai
ns
tre
am
 
LC
C
s 
2003 13 Air Polonia, Air Scotland, dba, EU Jet, FlyGlobespan, 
FlyingFinn, Germania Express, Get Jet, Iceland Express 
(now WOW), Jet2, Snowflake, VBird, WindJet 
2004 6 FlyMe, FlyNordic, MyAir, ThomsonFly.com, Vueling, Wizz 
Air 
2005 4 Air Turquoise, CentralWings, Sterling, Transavia.com 
(Transavia founded in 1965, established subsidiary low 
cost brand Basiq Air in 2000, merged Basiq Air and 
Transavia to form transavia.com***) 
2006 2 Click Air, Zoom UK 
La
te
 
A
do
pt
er
s 
2007 0  
2008 1 VolareWeb 
2009 1 Star1 
2010 0  
2011 0  
2012 0  
Airlines highlighted in italics were operational at the time of writing.  
Source: * Ryanair.com, ** airberlin.com, *** transavia.com 
 
4.1.1. Pioneers (1992-1998) 
Between 1992 and 1998, eight carriers commenced low cost operations in Europe. 
Some, including Ryanair (Ireland), Norwegian and Air Berlin commenced operations 
before 1992 but restructured their operations to become low cost operators to take 
advantage of the more liberalised operating environment. Others, including UK-
based easyJet, were new start-ups who sought to emulate the success of Southwest 
Airlines by adopting many of the features of Southwest’s business model (a so-called 
Southwest copycat). Collectively, these nine airlines pioneered low cost flying in 
Europe and also, crucially, benefited from first mover advantage and the relative lack 
of low cost competition (see Gillen and Morrison 2003). Significantly, four (50%) of 
 
 
10 
 
these pioneering LCCs – Air Berlin, easyJet, Norwegian and Ryanair - are still 
operational while the four that have left the market operated for an average of 8.5 
years. 
 
4.1.2. Early Adopters (1999-2002) 
The success of the pioneering LCCs and the continued liberalisation of the European 
air transport market during the late 1990s resulted in a new group of LCCs 
commencing flight operations between 1999 and 2002. Like the pioneers, most of 
these early adopters -  Basiq Air (Netherlands), bmibaby, Buzz and MyTraveLite (all 
UK), Goodjet (Sweden), HLX and Germanwings (Germany) - were based in 
northwest Europe (Slovakia’s Sky Europe was the notable exception). 75% of these 
early adopters were either subsidiaries of existing full service carriers or had been 
established by charter operators who had diversified into the LCC sector. Bmibaby 
was formed by full-service UK operator bmi british midland international in 2002 to 
counter the competitive threat posed by British Airways’ LCC subsidiary Go-Fly 
commencing operations from bmi’s regional base at East Midlands Airport. Buzz was 
established by KLM/UK to protect their market share at London/Stansted from the 
rapid expansion of Ryanair while the German national carrier, Lufthansa, founded its 
own LCC subsidiary, Germanwings. Charter airlines MyTravel (UK), Hapag Lloyd 
(Germany) and Transavia (Netherlands) similarly responded with their own low cost 
operators - MyTraveLite, HLX (Hapag Lloyd Express), and Basiq Air respectively - to 
counter the emerging LCC threat.  
 
Of the eight early adopters only one – Germanwings – is still operating (a failure rate 
of 88%). The seven carriers that left the market flew for an average of 5.7 years 
compared to the 8.5 achieved by the failed pioneer operators. Bmibaby was unusual 
in that it flew for 10 years (2002-2012) before being closed by its new parent 
company IAG (International Airlines Group) after it was put up for sale but failed to 
find a buyer. 
 
4.1.3. Mainstream LCCs (2003-2006) 
The majority of European LCCs commenced operations between 2003 and 2006. 
During this period, 25 airlines commenced operations in 11 different European 
countries. Of the 25 new start-ups, only five – Iceland Express (subsequently 
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rebranded as WOW), Jet2 (UK), Vueling (Spain), Transavia.com (formed as a result 
of a merger between charter operator Transavia and its low cost subsidiary Basiq Air) 
and Wizz Air (Hungary) - are still flying, representing a failure rate of 80%. Unlike the 
early adopters, only 52% of LCC start-ups in this period were diversified charter 
operators or FSC subsidiaries. The remaining 48% were Southwest copy cats. This 
suggests that many of the existing carriers who wanted to establish a low cost 
operation had already done so. The 20 mainstream LCCs that have now left the 
market operated for an average of only 4.1 years. 
 
4.1.4. Late Adopters (2007-2012) 
Two airlines, Lithuanian-based Star1 and Italian operator VolareWeb, entered the 
market relatively late in 2008 and 2009 respectively and represented an attempt by 
existing operators to try and break into the low cost market. These carriers only 
lasted an average of 2 years before ceasing operations.  
 
4.2 Chronology and typology of LCC market exit 
In addition to categorising LCCs according to the year they entered the market, a 
number of significant spatial, temporal, and operational characteristics relating to 
LCC failure and market exit in the European LCC sector can be identified. Initially, 
low cost flying was largely a phenomenon of the more industrialised and 
economically prosperous countries of northwest Europe before it spread south and 
east to the Mediterranean and Central and Eastern Europe at the turn of the 
millennium. As Dobruszkes (2013) has shown the expansion of LCC services to and 
within Central and Eastern Europe parallels EU enlargement and the accompanying 
expansion of the liberalised market. However, the number of subsequent LCC 
failures indicates that the supply of flights between certain airport pairs and within 
certain countries outweighed consumer demand for flights while intense competition 
between airlines forced financially weaker operations to leave the market. 
 
Although it has become something of a cliché to assert that it is possible to learn 
more from failure than it is from success, it can be instructive to examine past 
performance to try and identify characteristics of market failure in order to try and 
avoid their repetition. In this section of the paper, the focus is specifically on the 
temporal, spatial, and operating characteristics of the 33 European LCCs that left the 
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market between the year of the first failure, in 1999, and 2012. The operating history 
of the 33 failed airlines is presented in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1: Operating history of the 33 failed European LCCs.  
 
 
 
Collectively, the 33 failed LCCs had relatively short operating histories and flew for 
an average of 4.7 years. Five (15%) failed within a year of commencing operations, 
26 (79%) failed within 5 years, and 30 (91%) failed within a decade. Only three LCCs 
operated for over 10 years and all were subsidiaries of existing travel companies 
(Norwegian LCC Color Air was owned by the Color Shipping Line, Brussels-based 
Virgin Express by the Virgin Group, and bmibaby by bmi british midland and then 
IAG). 
 
The first failure and market exit of a European LCC involved London/Luton-based 
UK operator Debonair in 1999. Debonair was unusual in that it didn’t adhere to the 
traditional low cost Southwest-inspired business model. It operated a fleet of four-
engined 112-seat BAe146-100 and -200 aircraft as opposed to the more 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Air Polonia Under 1 year
Air Scotland 2-3 years
Air Turquoise 1-2 years
Basiq Air 4-5 years
bmibaby Over 10 years
Buzz 4-5 years
Centralwings 4-5 years
Click Air 2-3 years
Color Air Over 10 years
dba 5-6 years
Debonair 3-4 years
EU Jet 3-4 years
FlyGlobespan 6-7 years
Flying Finn Under 1 year
FlyMe 2-3 years
FlyNordic 4-5 years
Germania Express (gexx) 1-2 years
Get Jet 1-2 years
Go Fly 4-5 years
Goodjet Under 1 year
HLX 4-5 years
My Air 4-5 years
MyTravelLite 3-4 years
SkyEurope 7-8 years
Snowflake 3-4 years
Star1 1-2 years
Sterling 3-4 years
ThomsonFly.com 4-5 years
V Bird Under 1 year
Virgin Express Over 10 years
Volare Web 1-2 years
Windjet 8-9 years
Zoom UK 1-2 years
Operating duration 
Pioneers Early adopters Mainstream Late adopters
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conventional B737-800 (189 seats) or A319 (156 seats) and attempted to introduce 
‘Affordable Business Class’ into the market and serve major (and hence more 
expensive) European airports. As a consequence, Debonair’s cost structure was 
such that the airline was unable to maintain operations beyond 1999. The next two 
market exits involved British Airways’ subsidiary Go (following a management buyout 
and subsequent acquisition by easyJet) and Swedish operator Goodjet in 2003. 
Between 2003 and 2006, 14 LCCs left the market – many due to bankruptcy. A 
further wave of failure, which occurred between 2007 and 2009 (Figure 2) almost 
certainly resulted from a period of high and volatile oil prices and the effects of the 
global economic recession.  
 
Figure 2: Comparison of European LCC start-up and failure dates. 
 
 
While it may be possible to map LCC failure to world events to offer an explanation 
for their demise, it is also necessary to examine both when the failed LCCs 
commenced operations and also which type of LCC model they adopted to ascertain 
whether particular types of operation were more or less vulnerable to failure. 
Significantly, the later an airline commenced operations, the shorter its average 
period of operation (Figure 3).  
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Figure 3: Average operating duration of the failed LCCs (years). 
 
 
 
The four failures among the pioneering LCCs operated for an average of 8.5 years. 
This compares with 5.7 years for the 7 failed early adopters, 4.1 years for the 21 
failed mainstream LCCs and 2 years for the 2 failed late adopters. The fact that later 
entrants into the market have struggled suggests that they tried to enter a market 
that was already saturated and too price competitive, with the result that the supply 
of low cost flights outweighed consumer demand for the services and existing LCC 
operators were able to use their market power and superior financial resources to 
see off new competitive threats. However, in addition to the year they entered the 
market, other factors are likely to have contributed to their failure. 
 
Based on Francis et al’s (2006) typology of LCC business models, it was found that 
12 (35%) of the failed LCCs were Southwest copycats, 12 (35%) were diversified 
charter operators, 9 (27%) were FSC subsidiaries and one (Debonair) didn’t follow 
any particular model. In total, 59% of failures occurred among LCCs affiliated to or 
operated by existing FSCs and charter airlines. Were it not for the fact that 7 of the 9 
surviving European LCCs were established by existing operators, this would appear 
to suggest that existing airlines find it hard to culturally adapt to the LCC model or, 
conversely, they considered that their LCC subsidiaries were becoming too 
successful (either through threatening the competitive position of the parent carrier 
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by undermining its market share or diluting the main brand) and were thus 
reabsorbed into the main carrier or disbanded. 
 
However, when one considers that of the remaining nine operational LCCs, two 
(Germanwings and Vueling) are direct FSC subsidiaries, Air Berlin, Norwegian and 
Ryanair are the results of regional carriers that restructured their operations to 
become LCCs (although Air Berlin has recently moved away from this model), Jet2 
was established by UK cargo operator Channel Express and Transavia.com was 
formed as a result of a merger between charter carrier Transavia and its low cost 
subsidiary Basiq Air this theory does not appear to be true. Indeed, only easyJet and 
Iceland Express (now flying as WOW) were established as standalone Southwest 
copycats. These findings appear to suggest that more complex interactions than 
simply date of market entry and type of business model are at work.  
 
4.3 Ownership characteristics of failed LCCs 
50% (17 of the 34) failed European LCCs were ‘privately owned’ by individuals or by 
corporations that previously had no involvement in commercial aviation activities. A 
further 11 (32%) were owned or established by existing airlines and/or travel 
companies. The ownership of the remaining six could not be conclusively determined. 
In terms of operational success, the majority of privately owned LCCs failed less 
than two years after they were formed whereas airline-owned LCCs fared better. 60% 
of FSC subsidiaries and diversified charter operators lasted for more than four years 
before ceasing operations and three operated for over 10 years. 
 
LCCs that were owned or established by an existing airline had the inherent 
advantage of having access to experienced managers who could devise (and then 
often be seconded to run) the new operation. The original Chief Executive of UK-
based Go, Barbara Cassani, for example, moved from her post within British Airways 
to lead the new low cost venture. A further advantage for airline-owned LCCs is that 
they may also have the financial and/or organisational backing of the parent 
company (such as Channel Express’ support for Jet2 and TUI’s for Thomsonfly) and 
thus have immediate access to suitable aircraft, trained engineers, a pool of qualified 
flight crew and ground staff, and access to established online computer reservation 
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systems. They may also conversely, however, be potentially disadvantaged by the 
historical legacy and operational inertia of the parent company.  
 
Some of the FSC subsidiaries and diversified charter LCCs analysed ceased 
operations following strategic decisions taken by their parent companies to halt LCC 
services and concentrate on their core brand. Independent LCC operators, on the 
other hand, while they may not have enjoyed such generous financial backing or 
access to immediate technical and human resources may have been able to be 
more flexible and innovative. Indeed, it is often the originally independent and 
privately-owned LCCs, like easyJet, who have driven developments in ICT, internet 
reservations and social media and taken inspiration from other areas of corporate 
business strategy and successfully applied them to the commercial aviation sector. 
 
4.4 The relative ‘size’ of failed LCCs 
In addition to the date when they entered the market and their ownership structure, 
the relative ‘size’ of individual LCCs and the strategic decisions they make about 
aircraft are also important indicators of likely success or failure. Although the relative 
‘size’ of airlines can be measured by a number of individual metrics, including annual 
revenue passenger kilometres, number of employees, number of routes operated, 
number of different countries served, number of passengers transported and 
operating revenue, use is made of the number of destinations served and the 
number and composition of aircraft in their fleet at the point they ceased operations 
as a proxy for the relative size and scope of their operations (Table 3). 
 
Table 3: Comparative size of the failed LCCs at time of closure (-) indicates where 
data could not be accurately determined or verified. 
 
Airline  Destinations 
served 
Fleet 
size 
Fleet composition* 
Air Polonia 28 6 2 x B734, 2 x B733, 2 x Let410 
Air Scotland 15 3 2 x B752, 1 x A320 
Air Turquoise 4 1 1 x ATR42-500 
Basiq Air  24 3 3 x B737  
Bmibaby  23 14 12 x B733, 2 x B735 
Buzz  24 12 6 x BAe146, 6 x B733 
Centralwings 56 12 1 x MD80, 3 x B733, 8 x B734 
Click Air  41 26 26 x A320 
Color Air 6 3 3 x B733 
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Dba  43 48 32 x B733, 2 x BAe146, 14 F70/100 
Debonair 9 16 3 x B733, 13 x BAe146 
EU Jet 21 6 6 x F100 
FlyGlobespan 26 9 2 x B737, 3 x B738, 4 x B763 
Flying Finn 5 2 2 x MD83 
FlyMe 25 6 5 x B733, 1 x B735 
FlyNordic 16 7 3 x MD82, 4 x MD83  
Germania Express (gexx) 15 12 12 x F100 
GetJet - - - 
Go Fly  31 27 27 x B733 
Goodjet 8 8 6 x A320, 1 x B733, 1 x B752 
HLX 37 19 17 x B733, 2 x F100 
MyAir 27 8 3 x A320, 4 x CRJ900 
MyTravelLite  10 4 4 x A320 
SkyEurope 30 13 7 x B733, 2 x B735, 4 x B737 
Snowflake  - 4 2 x MD82, 2 x B738 
Star1 9 1 1 x B737 
Sterling 39 27 4 x B735, 15 x B737, 7 x B738, 1 x MD83 
ThomsonFly.com  - 4 4 x B735 
V Bird 15 4 4 x A320 
Virgin Express  24 10 5 x B733, 5 x B734 
Volare Web  4 2 2 x A320 
Windjet 26 12 12 x A230 
Zoom UK 10 3 1 x B762, 2 x B763 
*A320 = Airbus A320, BAe146 = British Aerospace BAe146, B733 = Boeing 737-300, B734 = Boeing 
737-400, B735 = Boeing 737-500, B737 = Boeing 737-700, B738 = Boeing 737-800, B752 = Boeing 
757-200, B762 = Boeing 767-200, B763 = Boeing 767-300, CRJ900 = Canadair Regional Jet 900, 
F100 = Fokker 100. MD80/82/83 = McDonnell Douglas MD80/82/83. Fleet data derived from 
planespotters.net, 2013. 
 
Based on available data, the 33 failed operators flew to an average of 22 
destinations. The scope of LCC operations ranged from Air Turquoise, which only 
served 4 destinations, to Centralwings which served 56. Collectively, the failed LCCs 
operated an average of 10 aircraft (ranging from one in the case of Air Turquoise to 
48 in the case of dba). 
 
Of the 332 aircraft these LCCs collectively operated, 57% were B737 family and 18% 
were A320 family members (e.g. A319s, A320s or A321s) with smaller numbers of 
Fokker 70s and Fokker 100s (10%), BAe146s (6%) and MD80/82/83s (4%) (see 
Figure 5). The remaining proportion was made up B767s, CRJ900s, B757s, Let 410s 
and a single ATR42-500. Over 99% were jet aircraft and only 1% (3 aircraft) were 
turboprops (two Let 410s and a single ATR-42). 
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Figure 5: Type of aircraft operated by the failed LCCs. 
 
Of the 32 of the 34 failed LCCs for which fleet data is available, 60% operated one 
type of aircraft, 31% flew 2 and 9% operated 3. In this context, B737 Classics (i.e. 
B737-300, B737-400 and B737-500 series) were distinguished from Next Generation 
B737-700 and B738-800 airframes. MD80/82/83 were counted as one type as were 
F70/100 and Boeing 767-200s and -300s on grounds of type commonality and 
multiaircraft type rating. 
 
In contrast, at the time of writing, 6 of the 9 surviving LCCs operate a single type of 
aircraft, Jet2 operate 2 (B737-300 and B757-200), Norwegian operate 3 (B737-300 
and B737-800 and A340 respectively) and Air Berlin operate 5 (A320 family, A330, 
B737NG family, Dash-8, and ERJ-190). Thus fleet diversity (which conventionally 
has been seen as a detriment to a low cost base) does not appear to be a barrier to 
success. What is interesting, however, is the aircraft mix of surviving LCCs. Of the 
854 aircraft they collectively operate 98.8% are jets and 1.2% are props (Dash-8s). 
Just under half (49.5%) are B737NGs and 43% are A320 family aircraft. Similarly, 
although the number of aircraft and the ‘size’ of an airline’s operation undoubtedly 
confers significant economies of scale, not all the surviving LCCs have large fleets. 
Although Ryanair with 303 B737-800s has the largest fleet and both easyJet and Air 
B737s
A320
F70/100
BAe146
MD80/82/83
B767
CRJ900
B757
LET410
ATR42
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Berlin operate 193 and 122 aircraft respectively, 5 operators fly fewer than 41 aircraft 
and WOW has only two. 
 
4.5 The geography of European LCC failure  
LCC success and failure in Europe has a significant spatial dimension.  The first 
LCCs to enter the market were predominately based in countries of northwestern 
Europe and initially began flying services between secondary or regional airports in 
the hinterland of major European cities (the only notable early exception to this was 
Virgin Express who were based at Zanvantem airport). As a consequence, they 
initially avoided direct airport-pair competition with incumbent full-service operators 
and were able to carve out a distinct operating niche that complemented, rather than 
directly competed with, existing FSC and regional airline services. Although 
liberalisation is a feature of all EU member states, LCCs have only emerged in a few 
countries. The 34 LCCs that left the market originated in 16 different countries 
although of these, almost a third (29%) were registered in the UK (one of the first 
countries to liberalise bilateral air service agreements) while a further 3 each came 
from Italy, Germany and Sweden. LCC Snowflake was unusual in that it was a 
subsidiary of the pan-national SAS (formerly Scandinavian Airlines System). While it 
is possible to advance speculative theories as to why Austria, Greece, Luxembourg, 
Portugal, and Switzerland have not been the home of LCCs start-ups, proving direct 
causal relationships is fraught with difficulty and thus regrettably remains beyond the 
scope of this paper.  
 
5. Conclusion 
While it is appreciated that airline failure and volatility is of course not restricted to 
the low cost sector, it is important to note that studies of LCCs have often focused on 
their success and their impact on competition and legacy carriers. While it is very 
difficult to create a guaranteed recipe for LCC success, our research has shown 
there are a number of features that characterise failed carriers and it is to these 
characteristics the final section of the paper now turns. 
 
As Alamdari and Fagan (2005) suggested, strict adherence to the original Southwest 
inspired low cost model appears to be an important element of success. This 
requires carriers to only fly one type of aircraft to keep costs low and select an 
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aircraft that seats over 130 passengers and offers both good service reliability and 
fuel efficiency. It also requires carriers to identify routes that will generate sufficient, 
sustained and preferably year-round long-term demand and revenues. Indeed, it 
could be argued that a number of LCCs have failed as a result of the routes they 
operated and the aircraft they flew. UK-registered LCC EUJet, for example, flew a 
fleet of Fokker 100 aircraft on services to/from the relatively inaccessible Manston 
Airport in Kent but was unable to generate the financial returns required to remain 
operational. In contrast, Ryanair has developed into a highly successful low cost 
operator that flies 303 B737-800 aircraft and over 79 million passengers a year 
to/from multiple destinations at secondary airports across Europe (Ryanair 2013) 
while easyJet has grown from an operation employing two leased aircraft in 1995 to 
an airline operating 193 aircraft and carrying over 59 million passengers a year in 
2012 (easyJet 2013).  
 
If it is possible to define a recipe for success, creating a strong and memorable 
brand and product, being one of the first entrants into a market, basing operations 
somewhere in north-western Europe, adhering to the original Southwest Airlines 
LCC model and/or securing the backing of an existing airline, employing modern 
B737 or A320 family aircraft on short-haul point-to-point services, growing 
expeditiously as market conditions dictate, and vigorously defending their market 
share and avoiding direct competition with rivals appears to offer a good start. 
Several of the successful pioneering LCCs have also been led by a charismatic and 
often controversial figurehead who attracts and maintains media interest in the 
company.  
 
LCCs that have failed have typically been ‘smaller’ in terms of resources, fleet size, 
and the scale and scope of their operation and thus more vulnerable to bankruptcy 
or take-over. Many failed operators did not strictly adhere to the original low cost 
model and/or branched out into new and ultimately unprofitable ventures such as 
Debonair’s ‘Affordable Business Class’ product and the failed ‘low cost’ business 
class only airlines Silverjet, Eos and MaxJet. Other operators have suffered because 
they arguably failed to sufficiently differentiate themselves from the parent brand (e.g. 
MyTravelLite and Thomsonfly), entered the market relatively late and so lacked first 
mover advantage (e.g. Star1), or employed aircraft that were costly to maintain and 
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fuel inefficient (e.g. EUJet’s 100 seat Fokker 100s and Debonair’s fleet of 112 seat 
BAe-146s).  
 
While European air transport liberalisation undoubtedly introduced some welcome 
dynamism and competition into the airline market, the transition from a regulated to a 
more open market has not always been smooth. Although the newly liberalised 
operating environment enabled new carriers to commence operations, it also created 
a situation in which arguably too many airlines were competing for too few customers. 
Early adopters of the low cost airline model were largely successful in stimulating 
new demand for their services and growing their business but later entrants found it 
increasingly difficult to compete and 77% of European LCCs start-ups have now 
failed. Given continuing global economic uncertainty in Europe combined with a 
relatively mature and increasingly saturated market, it is contended that, in the short 
term, opportunities for new LCCs in most areas of Europe are limited. Consequently, 
any substantial LCC growth is likely to occur in other world regions, including the 
Middle East, Far East and Africa, which are reconfiguring and deregulating their air 
transport markets. Indeed, it would appear that there are opportunities in these 
regions for European LCCs to grow their business and/or establish new ventures to 
grow new markets as the formation of the pan-African LCC Fastjet by easyJet’s Sir 
Stelios Haji-Ioannou has recently demonstrated. Given the experience of LCC 
market entry and exit in the US and Europe, similar cycles of dramatic growth and 
decline in these world markets appears likely. 
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